California - end of growth? by William Burke
William Burke
California is the nation's trend-setter, and its
shift to a pattern of slower growth in recent
years thus has important implications for the
broader national economy as well as for its own
future. True enough, the state's economy gen-
erated $125 billion in personal income in 1974,
or about one-ninth of the national total. (In
terms of income, California by itself would easily
rank among the world's ten largest nation-
states.) But the growth which brought Califor-
nia to its present eminence has created a tread-
mill effect, which results in serious adjustment
problems whenever the treadmill slows down.
In even the mildest business recession, unem-
ployment soars and other signs of stress appear.
In 1971, for example, the jobless rate averaged
8.8 percent-greater by half than the national
rate-and in the first half of 1975 it reached a
record 9.7 percent.
For more than a century, rapid economic
growth has been the hallmark of the California
experience, and the economy frequently appears
rudderless in periods such as the present, when
there is no new growth sector on the horizon.
The state's history has usually been written in
terms of successive boom periods, based upon
such leading sectors as gold, wheat, food proc-
essing, oil, the military, and (perennially) land
development. The rapid expansion of the aero-
space-electronics industry in the past quarter-
century has been only the latest in a long series
of booms transforming the California landscape.
However, busts have been just 'as much a part of
California history as booms, and the major ques-
tion of the 1970's concerns the state's ability to
weather both a cyclical recession and the matur-
ing of the key aerospace-electronics sector.
25
Any economy of California's present size,
with its heavy consumer, business, and pub1ic-
works demand, is better able to sustain 10ng-
range economic growth in the face of cyclical
downturns than a smaller area would be. But
the state's economy has diversity as well as size
in its favor. California's aerospace-related ac-
tivities account for 19 percent of the nation's
income from that source, but at the same time
they account for only about 51 /2 percent of the
state's total income. California's farmers lead
the nation with 101 /2 percent of U.S. farm in-
come, but they account directly for less than 3
percent of the state's total income. Similarly,
California's builders lead the nation with 9 per-
cent of U.S. construction income, but they ac-
count for only 4 percent of the state's total in-
come. California thus boasts a welcome diversity
that normally cushions downturns occurring in
anyone sector and thereby provides a strong
underpinning for well-balanced growth.
As a reflection of its earlier troubles, Cali-
fornia entered the recent recession with a much
higher jobless rate than the rest of the nation.
However, the recession itself was not so steep in
California, largely because it is less dependent
than the nation on autos and other cyclical in-
dustries. Civilian employment elsewhere in the
nation dropped at a 6.2-percent annual rate be-
tween the September 1974 high and the March
1975 low, while California employment dropped
at a 2.6-percent rate during this period. Thus,
the margin between California's jobless rate and
the fast-rising national rate narrowed to one per-
centage point in the first half of 1975, compared
to a spread of I V2 to 2 percentage points dLiring
the several preceding years.Percent
Chart 1
California Share of U.S. Personal Income
Nonetheless, this recession period aside, Cali-
fornia has declined in importance relative to the
rest of the nation over the past decade. In the
preceding decade (1954-64), California's share
of the nation's personal income jumped from
9.5 percent to 11.4 percent, but then the state
began to lag, so that its share of total income
then fell to 10.9 percent in ]974 (Chart 1). The
relative decline was less noticeable in real terms,
because consumer prices rose more slowly in
California than in the nation over this past dec-
ade. However, the contrast was quite striking in
relation to what went before. Real personal in-
come increased nationwide by 48.6 percent be-
tween 1954 and 1964, and by almost the same
amount (46.0 percent) between 1964 and
1974, but California's real growth declined from
70.4 percent in 1954-64 to 44.4 percent in the
1964-74 period.
California's relative performance over the
past decade can be measured by analyzing, for
each income category, three separate sources of
growth-national growth, industry mix, and re-
gional share (see table).' The "nationalgrowth"
effect can be calculated by assuming that Cali-
fornia had precisely the same structural mix of
income sources as the nation possessed at the
outset of the period, and that each of those sec-
tors then grew at the same rate in California as
in the nation. The "industry mix" effect reflects
the relative importance in the West of national
fast-growing (or slow-growing) income sources.
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26The "regional share" effect retlects the growth
of individual California income sources in rela-
tion to their national counterparts.
California's 1964-74 increase in real income
was based almost entirely upon its similarity to
national income patterns (national-growth ef-
fect). In contrast to earlier periods of rapid
growth, its income structure was weighted
more toward slow-growing than fast-growing
sources of national income growth (industry-
mix effect). Indeed, only 3 of its 14income cate-
gories recorded positive growth from this source
-professional and social services, state-local
government, and (above all) transfer payments,
such as social-security benefits and unemploy-
ment insurance. Much of the weakness in this
respect stemmed from the importance in the
California economy of such national slow-grow-
ers as aerospace manufacturing, other manufac-
turing and trade. More particularly, and in even
greater contrast to earlier periods of rapid
growth, most of California's individual indus-
tries lagged behind their national counterparts
(regional-share effect). The slowdown was
especially noticeable for such traditional fast
growers as construction, aerospace manufactur-
ing, and state-local government.
As these income shifts indicate, the state faces
serious problems, not least of them being the
continuous reshaping of earlier growth sectors
along more modest lines. Another basic prob-
lem concerns the ability of the state and its peo-
ple to adjust their planning to a state of affairs
where the possibility-or even the desirability-
of rapid growth can no longer go unquestioned.
After a century of equating rapid growth with
virtue, Californians may find it difficult to make
the necessary adjustments.
Crucial Role of Aerospace
Chart 2


















The state's problems are exemplified by the
bellwether aerospace-electronics industry. At
its peakin 1967-68, the industry employed more
than 600,000 workers, under the stimulus of the
Vietnam war, the space race, the commercial-
aircraft boom, and the consumer-electronics
boom. Then each of these sources of demand
weakened, throwing 180,000people out of work
and leading to a state-wide slump even before
the onset of the 1970 national recession. Re-
covery from the slump began around mid-1971,
helped along by the Congressional rescue of
Lockheed and its L-l0 11 transport project with
a $250-million loan. (At the same time, Con-
gress let Boeing's supersonic transport project
die, and for a prolonged period Seattle became
even more depressed than Southern California.)
The strengthening of military and (later) com-
mercial business provided support for a re-
bound, but by the onset of the next recession
only about one-third of the lost jobs had been
recovered (Chart 2).
California's aerospace industry has been
based from the very beginning upon heavy in-
jections of federal money. In 1974, defense and
27space-agency contract awards reached a ncw
peak of $8.9 billion-23 percent of the national
total-and thereby helped offset the developing
weakness in commercial-aircraft and civilian-
electronics business. Only one major new proj-
ect has gotten underway in recent years-the
space-shuttle project-but awards for ongoing
aircraft and missile contracts have risen sharply
since 1971, and thereby have contributed to the
industry recovery. The state's economy thus
relies heavily upon political decisions made in
Washington about the product-mix of the na-
tional aerospace industry. Aerospace systems in
the 1960's and 1970's have been grouped in six
major functional categories-bombers, fighters,
transports (and associated commercial prod-
ucts), missile systems, anti-missile systems and
space systems. The 24 major aerospace systems
which have been developed in this period have
come from one or another of the industry's nine
major production lines, three of which are in
California. 2
In the past, each phasing-out of a major gov-
ernment contract generally has coincided with
the phasing-in of a new one, with the contract
for the new system being awarded two to three
years before the scheduled termination of the
old system. But since the national industry mar-
kets only a half-dozen major products, logic
might dictate that only a half-dozen production
lines be kept in operation, especially since most
of the major systems are due to come to the end
of their production runs within the next several
years. On the other hand, past experience sug-
gests that government contracts will be found
to keep most if not all of the present production
lines in continued operation. Despite the recent
upturn in military and space spending, individ-
ual firms could remain on rather skimpy ra-
tions, at least by past standards, as the available
federal funds are distributed on a fairly even
basis among all present producers.
One alternative would be to concentrate more
attention on the commercial-aircraft business,
especially in view of the worldwide popularity
of American jets, which have become even more
popular in recent years because of the bargain-
basement prices caused by the several devalua-
tions of the dollar. However, the commercial
market has long been dominated by a few
Douglas and (especially) Boeing models, and
new entrants into the market have had relatively
little success. Moreover, a general slowdown in
commercial orders now seems inevitable, partly
because of the recession-affected traffic and
earnings reports of the major airlines, and also
because of the cutbacks in scheduled flights
necessitated by the soaring price of jet fuel.
Another alternative for the industry would be
to diversify into non-aerospace business, a solu-
tion which has led to many troubles in the past.
In the severe postwar slump of the late-1940's,
many producers turned to making such products
as aluminum canoes, but these products sank
without a trace in the vast and unfamiliar con-
sumer marketplace. In more recent times, the
electronics segment of the industry has devel-
oped a number of successful new products for
the business and consumer markets, but this sec-
tor is today engaged in one of its periodic shake-
outs. Several aerospace firms have attempted to
break into the surface-transportation field by
providing equipment for the Bay Area Rapid
Transit system, but their work on that project
has been marred by prolonged scheduling de-
lays, substantial cost overruns and other features
typical of aerospace production at its worst. This
experience led David Packard, former Deputy
Secretary of Defense, to conclude, "The indus-
try does not yet know how to build complex re-
liable equipment at reasonable COSt."3
Contribution of the Knowledge Industry
The problems of California's aerospace in-
dustry will be solved not just by the infusion of
more federal money, but also by the continued
health of the "knowledge" industry, with which
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it has long maintained a symbiotic relationship.
The fortunes of the highly technical aerospace
sector, with its reliance on the continued devel-
opment of advanced and sophisticated products,have been closely tied for decades to the break-
throughs achieved in university laboratories and
research centers. The industry has found an
especially fertile field in California, which adver-
tises four of the top dozen orso graduate schools
in the nation. These schools attract large num-
bers of top-flight students, and thus a dispropor-
tionately large share of the nation's new scien-
tists and engineers.
California's dominance in aerospace has
come about because of the continued excellence
of these educational and research facilities-
facilities which have originated a circular devel-
opment process whereby research contracts gen-
erate production contracts, which make possible
stronger research staffs, which generate new
research contracts, and so on. (The key re-
source, skilled scientific manpower, also has
been attracted by the state's highly touted sun,
sea and sky, despite all the deterioration in this
respect in recent decades.) In the last analysis,
California's economic growth depends heavily
on investment in education, or human capital.
This type of investment helps explain the ob-
served discrepancy between the nation's rate of
economic output and the much smaller rate of
increase in measurable inputs of labor, capital
and resources. Indeed, many economists argue
generally that the greatest contribution to
growth is made by increased education and re-
lated advancements in knowledge"
Yet, California and the nation have recently
shown that they are no longer willing to invest
ever-increasing sums in the knowledge industry.
One major cause has been the decline in federal
funding of projects which had expanded rapidly
during the Great Society and the Vietnam war.
Other factors have included public dissatisfac-
tion with both the war and the antiwar move-
ment-especially in Berkeley, the cradle of the
college revolution-and the reaction against the
post-Sputnik glorification of science. In addi-
tion, many California voters tend to believe that
the state's higher-education system involves a
redistribution of income from poorer families to
higher-income families, as a result of the state's
somewhat regressive tax structure as well as the
substantial state support of prestigious institu-
tions where higher-income students are mostly
concentrated.
Federal support for the nation's higher-educa-
tion establishment, after increasing five-fold in
the 1960's, began to slow down even before the
end of the decade. For example, the number of
federally-supported first-year graduate fellow-
ships dropped 62 percent nationwide between
j 968 and 1972. In California, despite con-
tinued increases in dollars spent on education,
the university system's instructional budget per
full-time student dropped 20 percent in real
terms between 1967 and 1972. The University
of California has sharply trimmed its expansion
plans, partly because of funding problems, but
also because of enrollment problems caused by
the rapid rise in instructional fees, the cresting
of the college-age population, and the post-Viet-
nam disinterest in college life. The optimistic
plans of the 1960's, which envisioned a number
of major teaching and research facilities scat-
tered around the state, have now been shelved.
Other Symptoms of Deceleration
The scaling-down of the aerospace-knowl-
edge industry complex is only one symptom of
the deceleration in California's characteristic
pattern of rapid growth. More basically, the rate
of population growth has sharply declined, in
terms of both births and in-migration. (None-
theless, California has added more people than
any other state except Florida since the begin-
ning of this decade.) The natural increase in
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1974 totalled only 117,OOO-less than in 1950,
when the state's population was only about half
as large as today's 20.7 million total. Young
California families, like their counterparts else-
where, thus appear to have voted for zero popu-
lation growth, by reducing average family size
below the 2.1-child level necessary to sustain
long-term population growth.
The cause is difficult to pinpoint, but it mayChart 3
Sources of Population Change
have something to do with relative feelings of
affluence among young families. The postwar
baby boom can be explained by the ability of
young adults in that time period to achieve in-
comes quite high in relation to their Depression-
era expectations. But today, the large numbers
of young adults scrambling for jobs in the mar-
ketplace have had great trouble meeting the
economic goals they formed in the affluent post-
war period. They are less willing to have chil-
dren, and with the universal spread of effective
means of birth control, they are more successful
than their predecessors in actually limiting fam-
ily size. Whatever the cause, the phenomenon
means a sharp compression of those California
markets specializing in children's goods and
services, including elementary education, and it
also means the growing presence in the labor
market of large numbers of young women who
formerly would have been involved in child-care
rather than job-seeking.
Even more strikingly, migration-based growth
practically disappeared in the early 1970's. For
decades, migrants had accounted for about
three-fifths of the state's population growth,
with the net inflow rising at times to as much as
1,000 a day. The migrant flow has always in-
cluded a disproportionate number of productive
adults, whose home states (and nations) have
Thousands
1955 1960 1965 1970 1974
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borne the burden of raising and educating them.
This growth factor in particular is now missing
(Chart3).
To a certain extent, the recent decline should
have been expectedbecause of the close relation-
ship between migration and job opportunities in
the aerospace-knowledge industry complex. Mi-
gration has always declined during recession
periods, but not nearly so much as in the 1970's.
Even during the sharp 1958 recession, net mi-
gration reached 325,000 for the year. In con-
trast, the net increase was only 16,000 in the
much shallower 1970 recession, and it averaged
only 71,000 annually during the 1971-73 re-
covery. Part of the explanation lies in the abor-
tive nature of the recovery, which was consider-
ably weaker in California than elsewhere
because of the continued weakness of the aero-
space industry; thus, the unemployment rate in
]973 averaged 7.0 percent in California as
against 4.7 percent in the rest of the nation. But
there are other explanatory factors as well. A
California Poll taken in ]971 indicated that al-
most one-third of the population would leave the
state if given the chance, not simply because of
the lack of job opportunities but also because of
problems of pollution and overpopulation.
After a century of obsession with economic
growth, many Californians have become disen-
chanted with the pace and nature of their earlier
growth. For example, in 1972 California's
electorate-over the opposition of major busi-
ness and labor groups-imposed a moratorium
on all building along the coastline from Oregon
to the Mexican border. The measure was de-
signed to protect the entire 1,200-mile coastline
from uncontrolled development by setting up
regulatory commissions to grant or withhold
building permits for any projects planned within
1,000 yards of the ocean. This vote followed
hard on the heels of a California Supreme Court
decision requiring environmental-impact state-
ments to be filed with building-permit requests
on all private construction projects involving
a "significant" environmental impact. Another
political factor to be faced in June 1976 is the
"nuclear safeguards" initiative. By voting af-firmatively, California's electorate could em-
power the legislature to impose extremely rigid
safety and insurance requirements over all com-
mercial-power reactors, and thus could heavily
influence the future of the nation's utility
industry.
For that matter, California is peculiarly dis-
advantaged by the energy crisis, because it ob-
tains 89 percent of its energy needs from the
scarcest fuels, petroleum and natural gas, com-
pared with a 78-percent dependence for the na-
tion as a whole. (Of course, it has large oil
resources offshore, but those reserves remain
unexploited because of public fears of another
Santa Barbara oil spill.) 3 In addition, Califor-
nia's consumption is concentrated in the least
essential uses, such as private auto transporta-
tion, which accounts for almost one-fourth of all
energy consumed in the state. California's heavy
dependence on the automobile, and the long
distances traveled within the state, thus make
her especially vulnerable to the energy crisis.
Suburban home construction, suburban com-
mercial development, auto retailing, resort ac-
tivities, and many other elements of the life-style
which Californians have built around the private
auto thus would be seriously affected in the
event of a deepening crisis.
California's economic salvation depends upon
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the problem-solving capabilities of the state's
justly famed, albeit recently besieged, knowl-
edge industry. University training in the sci-
ences, and especially the application of scientific
advances to the development of new industries
and the solution of old problems, should play
an important role in the strengthening of the
state's economy. In the case of the aerospace
industry, California's universities trained large
numbers of highly-skilled scientists and techni-
cians; the research centers concentrated around
those universities attracted other highly-trained
workers; and the foundation was laid for the
state's dominance of this crucial new industry.
The impetus from the aerospace sector of course
has weakened in recent years, but the prime
mover-education and research-stands ready
to provide the spark of life to new industries as
yet unborn.
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